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780 The Journal of Human Resources our analysis, it should be noted, applies with equal force to models that employ teacher fixed effects.
We employ three strategies to counter the bias that arises from the processes of soning that arise across and within schools: the addition of an extended set of studentlevel control variables, the use of school fixed effects, and the use of a subsample of the schools that feature relatively balanced distributions of students across classrooms, based on observable characteristics."* Our results suggest that the bias from between-school sorting is large; the bias associated with sorting within schools, by contrast, is more limited in nature and may actually vary in sign across subsamples of schools. Ultimately, two characteristics-teacher experience and licensure test scores-emerge as robust determinants of tesl scores for fifth grade students.
Additional tests for differential effects by type of student provide suggestive evidence that the math score retums to teacher attributes are higher for more advantaged, higher performing students. This finding implies, first, that efforts to increase the math achievement of low-performing students by assigning them more experienced teachers could reduce average math test scores, potentially setting the stage for a classic equity-efficiency tradeoff. Second, it provides an additional possible explanation for the observed equilibriutn patterns of teacher assignment that favor more advantaged students.
n. Sorting, nonrandom matching, and the potential for bias in estimated teacher effects
The principal empirical strategy used in the economics literature to assess the importance of teachers and teacher characteristics is the estimation of education production functions, which generally take the form:
where i indexes students.^ indexes classrooms, and / indexes time (Rivkin. Hanushek, and Kain 2005: summaries by Hanushek 1986 Hanushek , 1997 Hanushek . 2002 Brewer 2000: Summers and Wolfe 1977; and Colemun et al. 1966) . The dependent variable is a standardized test score.'' The lagged test score is typically included in the equation to retlect the cumulative nature of the education process and is intended to pick up the effects of prior year school and family characteristics. The parameter 8 is in many cases constrained to be equal to one. In other cases, such as in studies for which lagged tesl scores are unavailable or in studies using adult outcomes as the dependent variable, 6 may be constrained to 0. In still other cases, the parameter 6 is estimated explicitly.^ The vector X,, measures the characteristics of student / at time ^ and may contain time-invariant characteristics such as student gender or race. The vector Xy, represents measurable school inputs, including class size as well as teacher chiiracteristics, Recenl literature has included teacher fixed effects as elements ofX,,,
Obtaining unbiased estimates of p;, the marginal effects of school inputs, is difficult because parent-or teacher-driven processes of across-schtwl and within-school sorting are likely to lead to a situation in which observable characteristics of students, teachers, and classrooms are correlated with unobserved, and hence omitted, factors related to student and teacher ability or to other factors that positively influence achievement, such as parental involvement. A similar problem arises in models that use teacher lixed effects.T he first such process, which we call across-school sorting, has to do with how teachers and students choose, or are assigned to, schools. As numerous empirical studies have shown, teachers' preferences among districts are influenced by factors such as salary levels and student characteristics, and among schools within districts by the characteristics of the students, with the more qualified teachers often showing both the inclination and ability to transfer to schools with more advantaged students,*" At the same time that teachers are milking decisions about where to teach, parents are also making decisions that affect how students are distributed across schools. Many of these parental decisions involve the choice of where to live, as in the well-known Tiebout (1956) tnodel.'' But in some cases, such as in districts permitting some form of school choice, parents may be able to choose among schools without having to move.
The second major process driving the matching of teachers with students, withitischool sorting, has received much less attention in economic models. Parents often form opinions regarding which of the available teachers in a school they would most prefer to teach their children; some act on these preferences by trying to Influence administrative decisions regarding who will teach their child (Hollingshead 1949;  6. Typically omitted from the standard tnodel are unmeasured characteristics of students, such as their abiliiy and motivation, that alTect achievemenl. Puwided such variiibles have cunstani effects on achievemcni ewer time and ihal their effects deterioiaie at the same rates as prior achievemenl. they cancel oiil in this lagged form of the production function. See Boardman and Murnane (1^79) fur mhcr assumptions that would generate this particular fonn of the produclion function. In an assessment of the econometric issues raised by such models. Todd and Wolpin (20(), l) argue thai ihe value-added version of the model (5 = 1) assumes thai inputs have ihe same efCecls at all grade levels, while the explicitly eslimatctl version (lagged achievement) assumes that the effects of inpuis decay over time at a constant rate. Constraining 5 to 0 implies that only contemporaneous inputs matter. 7. The kind of nonrandom sorting obsen.'ed in schools has similarities lo jtib training programs. LaLonde I I98f)) compares experimental and nonexperimental estimation strategies in that latter application. 8. Empirical studies of teacher moves and quits reveal thai teachers are more likely to switch schools within a district, move from one district to another, or quit altogether if their original school has a higher percentage of low-achieving, low-income, or minority students or a high student-teacher ratio See New York Public Education Association (1955), Mont und Rees (19%) . Freeman. Scalidi. and Sjoquisi (2(X)2, Tables 10-12) . Lankford, t^b, and Wyckoff (2002 , Tables 10 and 11 ), Reed and Rtieben (2(K) 2). Sieber's (1982, p. 42) study of classroom assiijnmenLs in a New York City elementary school reports thai teachers normally "viewed as a rewarding and prestigious task" ihe assignment to classes wilb advanced students.
9. Empirical studies confirm that household residential demand is inlluenced by perceived school quality and by such school characteristics as racial composition (Bogan and Cromwell 2000) . Sieber 1982; Lareau 1987 and Oakes 1995) . Although many principals appear to resist such efforts, this kind of "teacher shopping" often seems to be successful (Hui 200.3) . Teachers themselves may be an additional source of within-schooi sorting. Experienced teachers, for example, may successfully resist being assigned less able students.
If these two processes result in the matching of more able students to teachers with stronger qualilicalions, a state we refer to as positive matching, coefficients on these qualitications will be biased upward. Available evidence indicates that positive matching of teachers and students is the empirical norm {Rivkin. Hanushek. and Kain 2005; Belts. Zau. and Rice 2003: Clotfelter. Ladd. and Vigdor 2005) .'" The alternative condition-negative matching-would occur if teachers with stronger qualifications were assigned to classes with the less able students.'' In such a scenario, coefficients on teacher qualifications would be biased downward.
ni. North Carolina data
The data we use for this study are derived from administrative records maintained by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC).'-North Carolina is an appropriate state for this analysis for several reasons. Because it has a statewide course of study, its tests are closely aligned with what students are expected to know and be able to do. Hence, test scores are likely to measure tuore fully what teachers have taught than In many other states. The state is relatively large and exhibits substantial variation across its 117 school districts with respect to the racial and socioeconomic mix of the students and student performance. Although teachers' associations in North Carolina have no collective bargaining power, crossdistrict variation in salary schedules, and variation in working conditions across schools, create incentives for teachers to sort in nonrandotu ways. Finally, we note that the state boasts a stable and relatively sophisticated peribrmance-based accountability system which could potentially exacerbate the incentives for positive matching (Clotfelter et al. 2004) .
We link several different sets of records to form the database used for this analysis. Student information, including race, gender, participation in the federal free and reduced price lunch subsidy program, and standardized test .scores are derived from student test records. In addition to these variables, which are available in many administrative data sets, responses to a number of supplemental survey questions, including information on parental education, students' computer use. hours spent watching television, and hours spent reading for leisure at home, as well as a measure of time spent on homework are also available. Each student test score record identifies the 10. See CkufelttT. Ladd. and Vigdor (2005) for a discussion of theoretical rationales for positive matching. 11. Negative matching might be predicted by a La/ear (2(K)] )-style model of an aggregate achievementmaximizing administralor. in the event that the reiums to teacher quality are highest for low-performing students. Evidence presented below suggest thai this condition does nol hold, at least for the measure of achievement utilized by North Carolina public schools. 12. While these data are not available lo the general public, researchers afiiliated with academic institutions can apply to [he NCERDC. located at Duke University, for access. name of the teacher who administered the test, In elementary schools, the teacher administering the test is most likely a student's regular classroom teacher." By confining our attention to fifth grade students, we are thus able to link the lest score database to infomiation on teacher qualifications. As far as we know. North Carolina provides the only statewide data set that permits the matching of teachers to students at the classroom level.
The leacher dala come from a state-maintained archive of personnel records. For each teacher, itiformation is available on licctisurc test scores, including the type of test taken and the year it was administrated; undergraduate itistitution attended, whether the teacher has any advanced degrees or is National Board Certilied. and the number of years of teaching experience. We formed a standardized licensure test score variable for each teacher by converting test scores from different test administrations in North Carolina to standardized scores using the means and standard deviations lor tests taken in each year by ali teachers in our data set.'•" The years of experience variable is the one used by the state to detemiine a teacher's salary, and generally counts all years of teaching whether in the State of North Carolina, or elsewhere, for which the state has given the teacher credit.'"^ Basic demographic information on each teacher, including race and gender, are also available.
Table I a presents basic summary statistics descrihing the fifth grade teachers working in North Carolina during the 2000-20001 school year, for hoth the full sample and also the evenly balanced school subsample. to which we will return in Section V. The vast majority of the 3,842 individuals matching our definition of a lilth grade teacher were female and white. The median teacher had between six and 12 years of prior experience and fewer than one in ten had no prior experience. The proportion of teachers with licensure test scores within one standard deviation of the mean is slightly more than would be expected with a purely normal distribution (73 percent 13. To verify that a teacher listed as administering a test to students in grade / in school j, was actually a classrtKjm leather in grade ; in school j. we cross-relerenced a separate Niirth Cardlina adminislrutivc data set, the School Aclivity Report, which records the identiiy and assignmenl of each leacher in each school. This cross-reference eliminates teachers who taught noncorc subjects in sthix)l_;( for example, iniisic. physical education), those who started positions al ihe schtxil niidyeiir. and ihose who had no regular position at Ihe sch(K)l. Student lest score records associated with an "'eliminaled" teacher are excluded from our analysis. Moreover, since we I'ocus on schools wilh more than one classroom per grade In order lt> exploit wiihinschool variation in teacher i;haracteristies, siudent.*; with a valid teacher bul in a school with no oiher valid teachers were also excluded Irom the sample. 14. From ihe early I %()s through ihe mid-l99()s. all elementary schiMil leachers were required lo lake either Ihc Elementary Education or ihe Harly Childhood Educalion lest. Slarting in ihe mid-iy'-X)s. teachers were required lo lake bolh an Elemenatary Education Curriculum and an Elementary Education Conteni lesi. We normalized test scores on each of these tests separately for each year the test was administered bused on means and standard deviaiions trom lest scores for all leachers in our data set, not just thctse in our 2001 subsei of liflh grade leachcrs. For teachers wilh mulliple test scores in their personnel Itie. our leacher tesi score variable equals the average of all scores for which we can perform this normalization. While in principle it would be interesting to enter licen.sure test .scores separately, ruther than as a composite, the potential for endogenous choice of test taken on the part of leachers would complicate any such analysis. 15. The teacher experience variable was missing for some teai'hers. In cases where it was possible lo observe experience levels in payroll records from other years, we imputed values. In cases where observations from other years' payroll data were inconsistent with the 2(KK)-2O(X)I reconl., we put more weight on ihe more recent record. rather than 68 percent), and the teachers with test scores outside this interval are disproportionately drawn from the lower tail of the distribution. Provided outside opportunities are positively correlated with teacher test scores, this distribution is consistent wilh a positive correlation between the probability of departure and access to nonteaching opportunities."' Most teachers graduate from colleges ranked by Barron's as being competitive, and more teachers are drawn from the schools at the low end of the 16. Reflecting differences in allemative employment opportunilies by teaching field. Mumane and Olsen (1989) show that ihc length of first spell in leaching varied significantly by leaching area. college quality spectrum than from the high end." This pattern reflects the fact that the largest teacher education programs in North Carolina are, by state policy, located in the state colleges, which are relatively unselective. Although North Carolina boasts the largest number of National Board Certified teachers in the country, they account for less than 4 percent of the state's fifth grade teachers.
The characteristics of North Carolina's 2000-20001 cohort of public school fifth grade students are summarized in Table lb . Once again, we focus here on the characteristics of the full sample and postpone the discussion of the evenly balanced school subsample to Section V. Students are more racially diverse than their teachers, and the proportion of black students significantly exceeds the national average. The median student has parents with a high school diploma but no postsecondary degrees, watches between two and three hours of television per day, only rarely uses a personal computer at home, spends 30 minutes per day reading for pleasure, and spends one to three hours on homework per day.'*^ Nearly four students in nine are eligible for subsidized lunch: and substantial numbers are rated as exceptional, whether gifted or handicapped. Relatively few students are either repeating the fifth grade or have limited English proficiency.
IV. Evidence of across-and within-school sorting
As discussed above, in the absence of purposeful intervention on the part of administrators or other officials, theory and previous empirical research suggest that teachers with better credentials will gravitate toward schools with more advantaged students. Tahle 2 provides evidence of across-school sorting in North Carolina fifth grade classrooms. The rows of the table categorize teachers in five ways, and the columns refer to average characteristics of students at the school level. The table entries are means of these averages, weighted by the number of teachers having the specified qualifications. In all cases higher entries for school characteristics represent higher proportions of more advantaged or higher performing students.
17. The categories were derived from informalion from Barron's College Admissions Selector for 1988, ba.sedon informalion for (irsi-year sludents in each university in 1986-87. Our category of very competitive includes universities rated as mosi competitive, highly competitive, or very competitive; competitive are those raied as competitive; less competitive are tbose rated as less competitive or noncompetilive; and ihe unranked category includes special programs such as art sch{x>ls, inlernationat universities, or universities for which we were not able to lind a rating. Barron's uses crileria sucb as Ibe median entrance examination scores, percentages of students scoring 50() and above, and (M) and above on both the math and verbal parts of the SAT or comparable scores for the ACT, percentage of studenis who ranked in the upper tifth or twotifths of their high school class, and the percentage of applicants who were accepted. If infonnation for a university was missing for I98S, we substituted the ranking for ihe 1979 or 1999 Selector, with the choice varying wilh ihe era in which the leacher allended college.
IK, The infonnation on parental education is based on teacher reports at the time the students are tested. Instead of using the reports of current teachers, we use those of each student's teacher in the prior year. We u.se ihese prior year esiimales in minimize any bias in our subsequent analyses of ihe effects of ihe qualiiications of fifth grade leachers on student achievement that could arise from any systematic under or overreponing of parental education correlated with the characteristics ol' ihe fifth grade teachers. Note: For leachcrs with u given qualification, table entries are averages of schtK)l-wide ligures computed over ihose .scho()ls with at leasi one such teacher. Using F-iesis. the hypothesis that student characteristics are eijual across teacher ()ualificutiun categories is rejeitet! in all but the following cases: teacher experience and percent of studenis with parents who are college graduates; teacher National Board Certification and all four student characteristics.
Consistent with the hypothesis of positive matching, the table shows that, by most tneasures. teachers with better qualifications typically work in schools serving higher proportions of advantaged students.''' Teachers with more experience, degrees from more highly ranked colleges, higher licensure test scores, or advanced degrees are more likely to be found in schools with higher proportions of students who are white. Note: For teachers with u given qualification, table entries in the first three columns are ratios of classroom characteristics to school-wide averages. Table entries in the last column arc mean differences between classroom and school-average test scores. *** denotes a ratio or mean difference significantiy different from one at the I percent level: ** Ihe 5 percent level; * the 10 percent level.
not receiving subsidized lunches, have college-educated parents and who scored well on the prior year test. The only nonmonotonic pattems appear in the relationships between teacher experience and parent education, and between college rank and percent nonwhite. Nonetheless, the general pattem is clear.
Measures of within-school sorting are shown in Table 3 . The rows display the same set of teacher qualifications as those shown in Table 2 and the columns refer to the same student characteristics. The entries, however, now refer to the average characteristics of students at the classroom level relative to the school-wide average.^" The clearest patterns emerge for the teachers with the lowest licensure te.st scores and the teachers who are National Board Certified. Teachers with the lowest test scores lend to teach in classrooms that have below-average percentages of white students and of students with college-educated parents, and they teach students with less average abilily as measured their prior year test scores than those in other classrooms. In contrast, teachers who are National Board Certified teach students who are more affluent. whose parents are more likely to be college graduates, and who are more able than students in other classrooms. Further evidence of this positive matching at the classroom level emerges from the observation that (he least experienced teachers tend to teach in classrooms with below-average proportions of students with college-educated parents, and teachers who have degrees from the least competitive colleges tend to be in classrooms with the least able students. Thus, the net effect of within-sehool sorting is qualitatively quite similar to the effect of across-schoo! sorting in that it tends to match the most qualified teachers with the most able students.
To investigate the extent of within-school sorting more formally, we conducted a series of x^ tests using 1.160 North Carolina elementary .schools with at least two fifth grade classrooms in 20(K)-2(K) 1. We conducted up to six tests in each school to examine whether students' classroom assignments are statistically independent of a set oi" six student characteristics: gender, race, patiicipation in the Federal subsidized school lunch program, whether the student attended the same schtwl in the previous year, the student's prior year test score (with categories being above or below the state average), and the prior year teacher's report of parental education.-' The null hypothesis in each test is that students were as.signed randomly aeross elassrooms within the school with respect to the speeified characteristic.
To reduce the probability of incorrectly accepting the null hypothesis, we raised the power of the tests by pooling information on student assignments in the third, fourth, and fifth grades in each school.^^ We also chose the relatively conservative significance level of 10 percent as the critical value for the tests. Finally, we examine the overall di.stribution of/^-values lor each set of tests to determine whether the sehools that we conclude are assigning students randomly are instead simply pre.senting insufficient evidence to warrant rejection of the null hypotheses. Were this latter possibility the case, we would expect a skewed overall distribution of/7-values. Under random assignment, the distribution of p-values should be roughly uniform. 30 . In this and .suhsequent analysis, we resiricl our atteiilion to schools wiih more than one dassriMim per grade. The mean for each school chardcteristic in ihe lirM three colutntis is 1 and in ihe fciurih column i.s 0. 21. We used the prior year teacher's report in order U) break any potential relalitinship hciwwn (he errors in ihe current teacher's estimates of parcnul education levels and Ihe particular sludents she teachers. 22, In these Icsts. we compare the aclual distribution of students in each classroom lo ihc expected distribution under the hypothesis of eveti assignment within each grade, in oiher words, variation in student composition across grades wiihin a school does not increase the size of Ihe chi-squared stalistic. .Some schtK)ls have data or multiple classrooms only for certain grades; for these schools our tesis are based only on the grades wiih adequaie data. The previous year test score and previous year uiiendance lesis use only fourth and tilth grade data, since we have no infonnation on tcs! scores or school attendance prior to ihird grade. As .shown in Table 4 , in 521 out of the 1,160 schools we failed to reject the null hypothesis of random assignment for all six of our tests.-^ Figure 1 displays the distribution of p-values for the parental education test for all the schools in the sample. The tests for about 6 percent of these schools exhibit p-values less that 1 percent, indicating particularly extreme departures frotn a random distribution of students by parental education. Beyond the 10 percent level, and particularly beyond the 15 percent level, however, the /^-values display a nearly uniform distribution, with close to I percent of all ;?-values in each band of width O.OI. This suggests that a relatively small number of schools are responsible for a large share of the systematic sorting made apparent in Table 3 .
Figures 2 and 3 show the distributions of/^-values from the x^ tests for students by race and subsidized lunch status. The near unifomi distribution of the p-values for the racial composition test suggests that only a very small fraction of North Carolina schools systematically segregate students by race within schools. At the same time. only a small mass of points emerge with p-values very close to one, indicating that few if any schools perfectly balance the racial composition of ail clas.srooms. That pattern is consistent with prior findings of low racial segregation across classrooms within elementary schools (Morgan and McPartland 1981 and Clotfelter. Ladd. and Vigdor 2003) . The pattern of p-values is less uniform for the free and reduced lunch status of 23. Under the hypothesis of random assignment, and presuming that the six chi-squared lests are independent, we would expect about 5.^ percent of schools to fail at least one lest, using tbe 10 percent significance level. Because the siudeni characteristics are likely to be correlated, however, the chi-squared tests are not likely lo be independent. As ;i result, we would expect a lower proponion of the schools lo fail at least one test. students. This measure of student socioeconomic status is actually the strongest predictor of separation acros.s classrooms in North Carolina, yet only a small fraction of schools show evidence of systematic separation by this variable.-"' We return to the sample of schools that failed none of the six tests in our modeling effort below.
V. Estimating the effect of teacher qualifications on Student achievement
In principle, the best way to determine the effects of teacher qualifications on student achievement would be to randomly assign teachers with different qualifications to schools and classrooms and to compare the test scores of students facing teachers with different qualifications. The previous section has documented 24 . Although it would be interesting to explore the reasons thai schools differ in the apparent randomness of their classroom assignments, observable indicators show little relalion with a.ssigiitiieiit patterns. Tables la and lb show that the nonrandom schools on average have slightly higher shares of black teachers and black, poor, and low-achieving students, compared to apparently random schools. Other than these relatively small differences, it is possible only lo speculate thai, for one reason or another, principals in ihe nonrandom schools are simply more open lo parental suggestions regarding classrixtm assignments than are principals in tbe apparently random schools.
that the actual distribution of teachers in North Carolina is far from random across schools, and that at least some schools systematically assign teachers lo classrooms with significantly different characteristics. As a result, the estimation strategy must be more complex and must explicitly account for the nonrandom distributioti of teachers. The goal is to approximate the results that would emerge from a truly randotn experiment.
Our strategy for estimating the effects on teacher qualifications on student achievement in the presence of across-school and within-school sorting has three main components. First is the use of a rich set of student-!evel control variables that includes both the demographic characteristics of students and their survey responses about the time they spend watching TV. reading, and doing homework. To the extent these characteristics are correlated with both achievement and teacher credentials, including them will ameliorate omitted variable bias. Second is the addition of school fixed effects. These fixed effects imply that coefficients are idetitified oti the basis of variation in teacher qualifications across classrw)ms within each school, eliminating any bias associated with aeross-scbool sorting. Third, we restrict the sample to the set of schools that, based on the yi; tests just discussed, have distributed students across classrooms in a way that balances observable student characteristics. Because any bias associated with nonrandom matching within schools is likely to be tiiost severe in schools that show evidence of a departure from even balancing, restricting the sample in this way will reduce if not eliminate it.
As a benchmark for analyzing the impact of sorting on estimates of teacher credential effects, the first two columns of Table 5 present a very simple descriptive specilication. Fifth grade math and reading test scores, standardized in each regression to have mean 0 and standard deviation one. are estimated as a function solely of teacher characteristics, as well as class size. The absence of control variables means that the estimated efTects should be interpreted as associations, not as causal relationships.
The table indicates Ihat many teacher characteristics, including both demographic eharacteristies and qualifications, exhibit strong and statistically significant partial correlations with student achievement. Relative to white teachers (the omitted racial category) black teachers and teachers of other races teach students with significantly lower test scores. Similarly, relative to fetnale teaehers. male teachers teach students with lower math and reading scores. The relationship between student achievetnent and teacher experience is nonlinear, with the peak occurring in those classrooms with teachers having between 13 and 26 years of experience; novice teaehers (the omitted base category) are associated with the lowest test seores. Teachers with degrees from less competitive institutions teach students with significantly lower test scores, and teachers with advanced degrees show a slight but insignificant tendency to teach students with higher test scores. Higher licensure test scores are associated with highertest scores. Finally, class size is a significant positive predictor of test scores, which could reflect efforts on the part of school adtninistrators to put low-performing students in smaller classes as in Lazear (20()I).
The other four regressions in Table 5 reflect the addition of student-level covariates to the basic specification. The third and foutlh regressions include controls for student gender, race, subsidized lunch receipt, parental education, time spent watching television, reading for pleasure, using a computer, and doing homework, but not for the 
Hi
•o E student's prior year test score.^'' The addition of these control variables alters the coefficients of the teacher characteristics in ways that are consistent with the phenomenon of positive matching. The difference between black and white teachers is greatly reduced, and the negative coefficient on teachers of "other race" has been reduced in the equation for reading and reversed in sign for math. The estimated impact of male teachers on reading scores is reduced by two-thirds in reading and is indistinguishable from 0 for math. The coefficients on the teacher experience variables continue to be largely significant, and the peak continues to occur among highly experienced teachers, but the magnitude of the relationships have declined appreciably. Teachers graduating from less competitive colleges continue to be associated with lower-performance in reading, and those with lower licensure test scores are associated with lower scores in both areas, but the magnitudes of these effects decline as well. Point estimates of class size effects continue to be positive, but the magnitudes are at most one-fifth the level of the initial estimates.-T he final pair of regressions in Table 5 adds a single control variable for each student: the student's fourth grade test score. As we noted earlier, lagged test scores are usually included in achievement models to account for the cumulative nature of the education process. When error terms are serially correlated, however, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable can lead to biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates, with the sign and magnitude of the bias depending on the direction of serial correlation.-' Given certain conditions, however, estimates of the effects of teacher qualifications on student achievement will be unbiased under either specification. The conditions are that the teacher qualifications be uncorrelated with both past values of observable characteristics and the error term, conditional on other observed variables. These conditions would be clearly met if teachers were randomly assigned to students. In such a scenario, teacher credentials are uncorrelated with observed and unobserved student characteristics, both past and present. An empirical test for whether our regression estimates mirror those that would be obtained from a random assignment trial, then, is 25. Because time speni on homework may be endogenously determined by teacher behavior, we have also estimated m«Hlels thai exclude the homework variables. The results arc similar cxtepi that the estimated effects of teacher experience are all .somewhat larger than in equations ihat omi! the hehavioral variahles. Coefficienis iin student characteristics, derived from the regressions reported in Tabk" 6. appear as Appendix Table AI . Student characteristic coefficients derived from other specitications are available frotn the authors upon request.
Our sample si?e declines hy roughly 1.000 students in each regression that adds student covariates. owing primarily lo missing data on suhsidized lunch receipt. Results estimated on a constant set of students across specifications yield qualitatively identical results. 26. It is worth noting ihat the addition of siudent covariates has much the same etlect in models wiih schmil fixed effects: the model without siudent covariales exhibits consistently larger estimated teacher effects. The implication is ihat positive matching within schools is at work, thus imbuing estimated teacher characteristics with unwarranted impaci. owing to omitted variable bias. 27. The sign of this correlation is unclear a priori. On (he one hand, unobserved but relatively permanent characteristics would generate positive serial correlation. On the other hund. because standardized tests are noisy signals of ability, some mean reversion is likely to occur which would generate negative serial correlation. Thus, while failure to control for lagged achievemenl will be expected lo generaie biased coefficienis under any but the most unusual circumstances {namely, when achievement is affected only by contemporaneous school and nonschool factors), the inclusion of a lagged achievement variable may introduce bias of its own.
whether the estimated coefficients are sensitive to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable.-Ĉ omparing the final two columns of Tahle 5 with the previous two indicates significant differences between models that do or do not include lagged student test scores and. hence, that we have not yet estimated unbiased causal effects of teacher characteristics. For example, the fact that the addition of the lagged dependent achievement variable causes the large negative effect of heing a black teacher to disappear provides evidence that the other control variahles are not suftkient to hreak the correlation between being a black teacher and being assigned to low performing students. Other differences have similar interpetations.
Fortunately, the unusually detailed character of our data, which makes il possible for us to match teachers and students at the classroom level, allows us lo incorporate school fixed effects into our achievement regressions (see Table 6 ). The inclusion of these school fixed effects means that the coefficients of teacher characterisiics in that table are estimated based only on the within-school variation in teacher characteristics, thereby eliminating any remaining bias associated with the nonrandom sorting of teachers and students across schools (but not within schools).-'' T\vo clear pattems emerge from Table 6 . First, introducing school fixed effects drives most of the effects of qualifications down, even relative to the attenuated levels observed in the final columns of Table 5 .'" Nonetheless, many of them remain statistically significant. Second, the two sets of estimates of the effects of teacher qualifications-those from the models with and without the lagged achievement variable--converge. The high degree of concordance of results across specilications gives us confidence that we now have obtained relatively unbiased estimates of the effects of teacher qualifications.
As displayed in Tahle 6, statistically significant positive effects on student achievement emerge for teacher experience (for both math and reading), teacher test scores (most clearly for math) and National Board Certification (for reading only). Compared to students assigned to teachers with no prior experience, students assigned to highly experienced teachers attain standardized reading and math lesl scores roughly one-tenth of a standard deviation higher in math and slighlly less than one-2K. As wilh tests of over identifying restrictions in instrumental variable estimation, this check focuses on a necessary but noi sufficient condition, (Hausman 1978) . 29, There may be some concern thai our use ol school fixed effects biases estimates of teacher credential effects downward. Such a bias would iKcur, for example, if school administrators had access lo superior information on leacher quality and hired teachers of uniform quality. In such a scenario, observed differences in teacher characterisiics across classrooms within a school would be olTset by oppusitc differences in unobserved components of quality. While we suspeci lhat such a bias is not likeiy to be empirically noiewonhy. readers with ditlering opinions may wish lo consider our estimates in Tables 6 and 7 as lower bounds for the true effect of leacher credentials on student test scores. The estimates in Table 5 would then serve us upper bounds.
30. In spiteoflhisevidencc.il would not beappropriate to conclude that the use of school fixed effects obviates tbe need for including studcnt-lcvel covariates. In unrcportcd spccificalions including schcxil fixed effects but no studeni-level covariates. the estimated relationship between most teacher credeniials and test scores is more positive than that reported in Table 6 -indicative of omitted variable bias associated wiih positive within-school matching. tenth of a standard deviation in reading.^' About half of this gain occurs for the first one or two years of teaching. After that point the experience-test score profile flattens considerably, with the peak occurring in the 20-27 year category in all four specifications. Students assigned to teachers with higher licensure test scores apparently do better in math, but the effect is relatively modest. A one-standard-deviation increase in teacher test score implies at most a 0.017 standard deviation increase in average student math test scores and a somewhat smaller increa.se in reading scores. Students assigned to National Board Certified teachers score on average 0.030-0.045 standard deviations higher in reading, but no higher in math.'-The estitnated impactof the quality of the teacher's college is uniformly small and in general is not statistically significant. The most surprising result is the consistently negative effect of a master's degree on student achievement. The coefficients suggest that, all else constant, teachers with master's degrees are less effective than those without.'' 31. In u miidfl applying student ;ind school fixed effects estimated for fourth through seventh graders Rivkin. Hanushek. and Kain (2(K).'i. pp. 444-451 (ind thai novice teachers were assix-iaied with tiialh achievement gains of 0.10? standard devialions below those tor tcuchers with six or more years of experience: Ibr reading the novice deficit was 0.045 standard deviations, Rockoff (2004) lind.s the difference in reading scores between teachers with 0 and ten years to be about 0.17. Our findings for 0 versus 6-12 years of 0.085 and 0,064 for malh and reading, respectively, are in this general range.
32. These results may appear to amflicl Goldhaber and Anthony (funhcoming), which is generally cited as a siudy finding signilitani positive effects of National Board Certification. A close reading of that article, however, reveals that no direct conflict exists. The Goldhaber and Anthony study finds thai icachers who are destined to become National Board Certified in thefulure are most eflective. and Iind no significani evidence thai leachcrs who became certified in Ihe past-the only group flagged in our analysis-arc mure or less effective Ihan teachers who never applied for certification. Goldhaber and Anihony also focus on older North Carolina daia, from the late 1990s. 33. In analysis nm shown here, we find (hat the more experienced teachers have a far higher probability of having a master's degree Ihan do the younger teachers. Further analysis of the characteristics of teachers who 800 The Journal of Human Resources In contrast to the teacher qualification variables, the coefficients of the teacher race variables in Table 6 continue to exhibit substantial variation across the specifications with and without controls for lagged student achievement. Because fixed effects for schools are included, the difference in coefficients only can be attributable to nonrandom assignment of teachers across classrooms within schools. In particular, it appears that black teachers tend to teach the lower performing math students within schools. Evidence for that conclusion emerges from that fact that once prior year pertbrmance is included in the equations, the coefficient for black teachers is closer to 0 and not statistically significant.
Analogously, the fact that the inclusion of the lagged achievetnent score eliminates the statistically significant positive effect of class size that appears in Columns 1 and 2 suggests that, consistent with Lazear"s (2001) theoretical prediction, low performing students may be disproportionately placed in smaller classes within schools. The absence of class size effects in Columns 3 and 4 does not mean that class size is irrelevant for student achievement. Instead it simply tiieans that once we use school fixed effects to focus on differences within a school, we do not observe sufficient variation in class sizes to estimate an effect. This methodology is thus far better suited to measuring the effects of teachers, which do indeed vary quite significantly within schools, than to measuring class size effects.-''Â lthough we have a good bit of confidence in the estitnated effects of teacher credentials that emerge from Table 6 . these equations still might not fully address the bias that arises from within-school sorting. To address that source of bias, we resttict the sample to the schools in which students were assigned to classrooms in a balanced manner, namely the schools that failed none of the six X' tests for random assignment of students. While it is still possible for there to be some form of nonrandom selection into classrooms in these schools, any such selection would have to be along a dimension uncorrelated with any of the six characteristics used in our tests." If nothing else, the probability of selection on unobservables should be significantly lower in schools that do not also feattjre selection on unobservables.
Tables la and Ib compare summary statistics for the overall sample and this evenly balanced school subsample, which includes roughly 40 percent of tiie lull set of students. In general, the characteristics of teachers and students in the balanced school subsample are quite similar to those in the full sample. With respect to the characteristics of teachers, only the racial characteristics differ between the two samples, with the share of white teachers in the balanced school subsample being about two percentage points higher than the share in the full sample (Table la) . get a master's degree would be desirable. One interpretation of these resulls is that the financial incentives to gel a master's degree that iire embedded in the single salary schedule represented wasted money excepl insofar as they keep some teachers in the profession so that students can benefit from their experience. 34. By way of comparison, we esiimaled a school fixed effects model comparable to those in Table 6 using gains in achievement rather than the lagged dependent form. Except for difterences in the first experience term (a larger effect for math and a smaller one for reading) and a large and significant positive effect for other race teachers, the estimated effecis in the achievement gain model were generally close to those in the lagged achievement model. 35. Seleclion along most of the student-level characteristics used in our chi-squared tests is nol an issue in many of our earlier esiimaies. because we control for mosl of those characteristics directly. Rather, our goal here is to identify schools that are less likely to select un unobservables across classnjoms.
With respect to the two sets of students, a larger number of statistically significant differences emerge, as shown in Table lb . The students in the balanced school subsample are on average somewhat more advantaged, in the sense of being more white and have higher prior year test scores and parents with more education than those in the full sample. Still, the ditTerences between the two samples are generally quite stiiall in magnitude. Table 7 shows the results of regression specifications identical to those in Table 6 . including school fixed effects and student-level covariates. estimated on the balanced school subsumple. Although the smaller sample generates somewhat larger standard cnors and hence coefficients that are somewhat less precisely estimated, the patterns and estimated coefficients are quite similar to those obtained with the lull satiipk. These tindings provide added support for our previous conclusions about the effects of teacher credentials. The factors associated with higher student test scores in the full sample, namely teacher experience and teacher lieensure test scores, continue to be significant predictors of achievement, with estimated magnitudes that are similar across the two samples. As with the full sample, the difference in test scores between student.s with novice teachers and those highly experienced teachers is roughly onetenth of a standard deviation, with a large portion of Ihese retums to experience occurring within the tirst few years of teaching. These experience etTects are in the range of those found in other studies employing similar data, but smaller than the largest estimates."* In addition, a one-standard deviation increase in a teacher's licensure test score now predicts a 0.012 standard deviation in student achievement in math.
In both Tables 6 and 7 , coefficients exhibit a tendency lo be higher when controls for lagged test scores are introduced as explanatory variables. In Table 7 , the higher coefficients are somewhat troubling as they suggest that lagged test scores are correlated with teacher characteristics even in schools that appear lo be evenly balanced. Note, however, that the fact lhat the coefficients are larger rules out the pt)ssihilily of positive matching in evenly balanced schools. In.stead they suggest that teachers with better credentials in these schoools are being assigned to less able students. If anything, then, the coefficients we report here are biased toward 0-the opposite of the typical concern in studies of this nature.^3
6. See Foomote 31, above, fora discussion of estimales found in existing liierature. 37. To provide further evidence along these lines, we e.stimatcd mtxlels iinalogous to those in Table 7 for ihe sel of .sch<x»ls lUal failed one or more lests for random assignment-lhat is. the set of schools excluded from Table 7 . These estimates are shown in Appendix Table A2 . Comparing specilications wiih imd wiihoul lagged achievement tesi scores reveals substantial evidence of bias associated with positive matching in thi.s sunipL'. The majority of teacher experience coeflicients. for example, decline upon intnxJuciion of ihe lagged tiepcndent variable.
We also estimated identical specifications using the sel of schools where we uniformly failed to reject ihe null hypothesis of random assignment using the 20 percent significance level. Whereas the original 10 percent criterion produced a sample aboul 40 percent as large as the full sample, the 20 percent criterion yielded one slightly smaller ihun one-fourth the original si/e. Resulis. shown in Appendix Table A.I. show the same pattern of increasing upon introduction tif lagged achievement controls shown in Tahle 7. The typical coefhcienl increase is smaller, however, suggesling lhat furlher increases in stringency would prtHJuce more complete convergence of coefficients across specifications.
Finally, we note thai coefhcienl magnitudes on teacher experience are similar across all specilications. lending greater conlidetice to the conclusion that any bias remaining in estimated specifications must be small. Sample is restricted lo the 521 elementary schools fur which i-hi-square lesis fail to reject the hypoihesis of random assignment along six dimensions: race, gender, parent education, prior year test score, whether a student attended the same school in the previous year, and free/reduced price lunch receipt.
VI. Differential effects by type of student
How teaehers are distributed among schools and across classrooms within schools relative to students clearly affects Ihe distribution of student achievement. One final question is whether it also affects the average level of achievement. The answer to this question hinges on the existence of nonlinearities in the relationship between teacher characteristics and student achievement."* To this point, our regression estimates have maintained the assumption thai the effects of teacher qualifications do not vary systematically across types of student.s. Table 8 summarizes the results of regression specifications that relax this assumption by interacting the full set of teacher characteristics with particular student churacterislics. including subsidized lunch receipt, parent education, and prior year achievetncnt.''' The regressions are estimated on the sample of North Carolina elementary schools with evenly balanced classroom assignment pattems. using covariates identical to those employed in 38. The answer to this question is also sensitive to the measurement of student achievemeni scores. Indeed. by icsting for nonlinear effects on athiovemeni we arc assuming thai we have idenlitied a valid measure of achievemeni and are measuring it linearly. Nonlinear hut nionoionic transformations of i)ur achievemeni lest scores may be equally valid measures of achievement but al.so may yield very differenl conclusions regarding the existence of nonlinear effects. We pr(.H;eed wiih this exercise under ihe presumption Ihal Ihc scale iif (lur achievemeni measure is an important one for policy piirposes^-il is used by the Slale of Nmih Carolina for the purpose of gauging progress in schools, and applying positive and negative sanctions lo schools and Iheir sial'f (Clotfelter et al. 20<)4). .14. In addition to these specifications, we esiimated models interacting student race (nonwhite vs. white) wiih leacher characierislics. None of the interaciiim c(>cf ficienis in [bese models wa.s siatisiically sifjnilicani. In the current study we do not examine the related qucsiion of whether students leam at higher rates when matched lo a teacher of the same race or gender, an i.ssue Ihat has been examined by 
5i "" "a? Table 8 reveals evidence ihat math score returns to teacher experience are significantly larger for students not receiving subsidized lunches-that is. for the more affluent students. All six interaction terms related to teacher experience are positive. The two largest interaction terms, identifying the differential impact of teachers with at least 20 years' experience on students not receiving subsidized lunch, are statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.""
The second column, which replaces math with reading lest scores as a dependent variable but otherwise replicates the first specification, shows no statistically significant interaction terms. This generai pattern of significant interaction terms for math but not reading is replicated in the third and fourth columns, where we interact teacher characteristics with a dichotomous variable measuring parental education. More experienced teachers have a significantly more positive impaci on the malh tesl scores of students with more educated parents: all six interaction terms are positive, and three are significant at the 10 percent level or above. Children of highly educated parents also tend to have relatively higher malh test scores when assigned to teachers who are neither black nor "other race." and who attended unranked colleges.
The final set of specifications interacts a dichotomous measure of prior achievement, based on students' fourth grade test scores, with teacher characteristics. Although all six experience interactions are once again positive in the math specification, none is statistically significant."*-To the extent that these results indicate that teachers with stronger credentials are more effective in raising the achievement ofthe more advantaged students, they have two important implications. First, reallocating teachers to students in a manner that offsets the pattern of positive matching described in Section IV above would have the likely effect of reducing mean achievement scores, at least for inath and as measured on the scale used in North Carolina. However, the normative implications of this finding are unclear, for at least three reasons: We do not know how units of test scores correspond to actual skili accumulation at various points along the skill distribution; we do not know how fifth grade achievement affects lifetime skill accumulation; and we lack the broader measure of social welfare that would allow us to value skill enhancements. Thus any compelling welfare assessment is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper.
40. Since Tables 7 and X both use tbe evenly balanced school subsample, comparison of the inicraction terms in Table 8 wiib ibe corresponding main effects in Table 7 provides some insight as Ki the Impact of teacher characteristics on ibe omilted group. For example, the two signiticant ptisitive coefticients on teacher experience/nonsubsidi;ed luncb student in Table 8 are smaller Iban ihe corresponding main effects in Table 7 . indicating that (be net impaci of teacher experience on subsidized lunch students is still positive. Complete results of Table 8 are given in Appendix Table A4 . 41. This labie shows several significant coefticients associaied witb teachers frotn unranked colleges. As Table lasbows . roughly 1 percentof evenly balanced school subsample teacbcrs fall into this caiegory. Thus, this result quite likely reflects ihe impact of u very small number of influeniial observations. 42. Among tbe oiher results, il appears ibai Hispanic teachers have a comparative advantage in educaiing lower-performing students. Since the evenly balanced school subsample contains only a bandful of Hispanic leachers (see Table la ), these results should be interpreted witb extreme caution.
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The second implication follows from the first: Particularly in a regime that attaches incentives to the mean level of achievement within a school, school administrators may well consider positive matching to be consistetit with their own objectives. Thus, the fact that we observe positive matching in equilibrium can be attributed to tour forces: the desire of teachers to find more amenable working conditions, the desire of parents to maximize the quality of their children's education, the desire of administrators to please potentially vocal parents, and the desire of administrators to maximize mean achievement. This confluence of objectives may explain why the alternative pattern of negative matching, which would be expected in a regime that supported a progressive distribution of teacher and other resources among students, is not the empirical
VII, Conclusions
The tendencies for teachers to seek out more congenial working environments and for parents to seek out desirable schools and teachers for their children are common features of public schools as we know them. Together, they usually produce a "posilive matching" of students to teachers, in which affluent or high-achieving students end up in classrooms taught by better-credentialed teachers. This positive miitching has the effect of confounding efforts to estimate the relationship between teacher characteristics and student achievement. To our knowledge, no previous studies have identified and measured both of these sources of positive matching. Our resulls indicate that the positive correlations between the strength of teacher qualifications and student achievement observed in cross-sectional data are driven largely by sorting ol" teachers and students across schools and, to a lesser extent, within schools. This paper illustrates, however, how detailed administrative data can be used to help disentangle omitted variable bias from true causal effects. Such data allow one to control for a rich set of covariates including school fixed effects, and to restrict the analysis to schools that feature a relatively balanced distribution of student observable characteristics across classrooms. Results suggest that the within-school matching is relatively minor in North Carolina, implying that specifications with school fixed effects ameliorate most concerns regiirding selection bias.
We also find that the only teacher qualifications that consistently predict improved student performance are experience and licensure test scores. For ihe typical student, the benefit from having a highly experienced teacher is approximately one-tenth of a standard deviation on reading and math test scores, and roughly hitlfofthis return occurs for the lirst one or two years of teaching experience."''' With respect lo teacher licensure scores, a one-standard-deviation increase in scores increases predicted student achievement in math by 1-2 percent of a standard deviation. These results suggest 43. h is wonh noting Ihal some school accountabilily programs, including, for example, itie federal N» Child Left Behind Aci. wiih iis atteniion lo the academic progress of suhgroups wiihin each sihool, could conceiviibly provide a counterweight by inducing administrators to pay closer aitcniion lo the iichievenieni of less advantaged children. 44. It is unclear whether [his return lo eurly teacher experience reflecis true gains in teacher qmlety or nonrandom attrition by low-quality teachers. See Rockoff (2004) for a discussion of this topic. 808 The Joumal of Human Resources that achievement-maximizing school administrators operating in a competitive teacher labor market would clearly reward experience, as is the current norm. Rewarding other characteristics, such as advanced degrees and National Board Certification, would be productive only if such rewards create indirect impacts, such as by inducing teachers to remain in the profession.
Using our subsample of evenly balanced schools, we find suggestive evidence that returns to teacher experience in the fonn of higher student test scores are consistently larger in math, although not in reading, for the more socioeconomically advantaged and more able students. This pattern supports the view that positive teacher-student matching increases the average level of student achievement in math and may help explain why school administrators have not been more vigorous in counteracting the positive matching that results from sorting.
It is worth reiterating that this conclusion about the tradeoffs in the allocation of teachers to students with differing characteristics says nothing about the social valuation of tho.se tradeoffs. Though it appears that efforts to offset the positive matching of teachers and students would reduce overall mean achievemeni in math as measured by test scores, the implications for social policy depend on at least two additional factors. First, the existence of complementarities in skill formation over a student's school career could militate in the direction of more investment for disadvantaged students, as suggested by Cunha. Heckman. Lochner, and Masterov (2005) . Second, because the ultimate outcomes of social interest are not test scores but rather a broader set of life chances it may well be appropriate to attach greater weight to achievement gains at the low end of the distribution. Thus, any social valuation of the tradeoffs involved with positive matching require further debate and discussion by social scientists and policy makers.
